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https://github.com/dolphin-emu/dolphin.git
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301218a103
Disc number is changed from bool to u8, and revision is changed from int to u16 (WADs can use all 16 bits, but discs can only use 8 bits).
335 lines
8.0 KiB
C++
335 lines
8.0 KiB
C++
// Copyright 2008 Dolphin Emulator Project
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// Licensed under GPLv2+
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// Refer to the license.txt file included.
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#include <cstddef>
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#include <cstring>
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#include <map>
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#include <string>
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#include <vector>
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#include <polarssl/aes.h>
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#include <polarssl/sha1.h>
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#include "Common/CommonFuncs.h"
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#include "Common/CommonTypes.h"
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#include "Common/MsgHandler.h"
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#include "Common/Logging/Log.h"
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#include "DiscIO/Blob.h"
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#include "DiscIO/FileMonitor.h"
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#include "DiscIO/Filesystem.h"
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#include "DiscIO/Volume.h"
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#include "DiscIO/VolumeCreator.h"
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#include "DiscIO/VolumeGC.h"
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#include "DiscIO/VolumeWiiCrypted.h"
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namespace DiscIO
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{
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CVolumeWiiCrypted::CVolumeWiiCrypted(IBlobReader* _pReader, u64 _VolumeOffset,
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const unsigned char* _pVolumeKey)
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: m_pReader(_pReader),
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m_AES_ctx(new aes_context),
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m_pBuffer(nullptr),
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m_VolumeOffset(_VolumeOffset),
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m_dataOffset(0x20000),
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m_LastDecryptedBlockOffset(-1)
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{
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aes_setkey_dec(m_AES_ctx.get(), _pVolumeKey, 128);
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m_pBuffer = new u8[s_block_total_size];
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}
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bool CVolumeWiiCrypted::ChangePartition(u64 offset)
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{
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m_VolumeOffset = offset;
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m_LastDecryptedBlockOffset = -1;
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u8 volume_key[16];
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DiscIO::VolumeKeyForParition(*m_pReader, offset, volume_key);
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aes_setkey_dec(m_AES_ctx.get(), volume_key, 128);
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return true;
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}
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CVolumeWiiCrypted::~CVolumeWiiCrypted()
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{
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delete[] m_pBuffer;
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m_pBuffer = nullptr;
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}
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bool CVolumeWiiCrypted::Read(u64 _ReadOffset, u64 _Length, u8* _pBuffer, bool decrypt) const
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{
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if (m_pReader == nullptr)
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return false;
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if (!decrypt)
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return m_pReader->Read(_ReadOffset, _Length, _pBuffer);
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FileMon::FindFilename(_ReadOffset);
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while (_Length > 0)
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{
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// Calculate block offset
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u64 Block = _ReadOffset / s_block_data_size;
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u64 Offset = _ReadOffset % s_block_data_size;
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if (m_LastDecryptedBlockOffset != Block)
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{
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// Read the current block
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if (!m_pReader->Read(m_VolumeOffset + m_dataOffset + Block * s_block_total_size, s_block_total_size, m_pBuffer))
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return false;
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// Decrypt the block's data.
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// 0x3D0 - 0x3DF in m_pBuffer will be overwritten,
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// but that won't affect anything, because we won't
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// use the content of m_pBuffer anymore after this
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aes_crypt_cbc(m_AES_ctx.get(), AES_DECRYPT, s_block_data_size, m_pBuffer + 0x3D0,
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m_pBuffer + s_block_header_size, m_LastDecryptedBlock);
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m_LastDecryptedBlockOffset = Block;
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// The only thing we currently use from the 0x000 - 0x3FF part
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// of the block is the IV (at 0x3D0), but it also contains SHA-1
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// hashes that IOS uses to check that discs aren't tampered with.
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// http://wiibrew.org/wiki/Wii_Disc#Encrypted
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}
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// Copy the decrypted data
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u64 MaxSizeToCopy = s_block_data_size - Offset;
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u64 CopySize = (_Length > MaxSizeToCopy) ? MaxSizeToCopy : _Length;
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memcpy(_pBuffer, &m_LastDecryptedBlock[Offset], (size_t)CopySize);
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// Update offsets
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_Length -= CopySize;
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_pBuffer += CopySize;
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_ReadOffset += CopySize;
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}
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return true;
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}
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bool CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetTitleID(u8* _pBuffer) const
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{
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// Tik is at m_VolumeOffset size 0x2A4
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// TitleID offset in tik is 0x1DC
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return Read(m_VolumeOffset + 0x1DC, 8, _pBuffer, false);
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}
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std::unique_ptr<u8[]> CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetTMD(u32 *size) const
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{
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*size = 0;
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u32 tmd_size;
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u32 tmd_address;
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Read(m_VolumeOffset + 0x2a4, sizeof(u32), (u8*)&tmd_size, false);
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Read(m_VolumeOffset + 0x2a8, sizeof(u32), (u8*)&tmd_address, false);
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tmd_size = Common::swap32(tmd_size);
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tmd_address = Common::swap32(tmd_address) << 2;
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if (tmd_size > 1024 * 1024 * 4)
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{
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// The size is checked so that a malicious or corrupt ISO
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// can't force Dolphin to allocate up to 4 GiB of memory.
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// 4 MiB should be much bigger than the size of TMDs and much smaller
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// than the amount of RAM in a computer that can run Dolphin.
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PanicAlert("TMD > 4 MiB");
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tmd_size = 1024 * 1024 * 4;
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}
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std::unique_ptr<u8[]> buf{ new u8[tmd_size] };
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Read(m_VolumeOffset + tmd_address, tmd_size, buf.get(), false);
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*size = tmd_size;
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return buf;
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}
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std::string CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetUniqueID() const
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{
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if (m_pReader == nullptr)
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return std::string();
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char ID[7];
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if (!Read(0, 6, (u8*)ID, false))
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return std::string();
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ID[6] = '\0';
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return ID;
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}
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IVolume::ECountry CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetCountry() const
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{
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if (!m_pReader)
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return COUNTRY_UNKNOWN;
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u8 country_code;
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m_pReader->Read(3, 1, &country_code);
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return CountrySwitch(country_code);
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}
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std::string CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetMakerID() const
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{
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if (m_pReader == nullptr)
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return std::string();
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char makerID[3];
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if (!Read(0x4, 0x2, (u8*)&makerID, false))
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return std::string();
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makerID[2] = '\0';
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return makerID;
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}
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u16 CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetRevision() const
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{
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if (!m_pReader)
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return 0;
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u8 revision;
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if (!m_pReader->Read(7, 1, &revision))
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return 0;
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return revision;
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}
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std::string CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetInternalName() const
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{
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char name_buffer[0x60];
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if (m_pReader != nullptr && Read(0x20, 0x60, (u8*)&name_buffer, false))
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return DecodeString(name_buffer);
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return "";
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}
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std::map<IVolume::ELanguage, std::string> CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetNames() const
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{
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std::unique_ptr<IFileSystem> file_system(CreateFileSystem(this));
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std::vector<u8> opening_bnr(NAMES_TOTAL_BYTES);
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opening_bnr.resize(file_system->ReadFile("opening.bnr", opening_bnr.data(), opening_bnr.size(), 0x5C));
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return ReadWiiNames(opening_bnr);
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}
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u32 CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetFSTSize() const
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{
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if (m_pReader == nullptr)
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return 0;
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u32 size;
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if (!Read(0x428, 0x4, (u8*)&size, true))
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return 0;
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return Common::swap32(size);
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}
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std::string CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetApploaderDate() const
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{
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if (m_pReader == nullptr)
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return std::string();
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char date[16];
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if (!Read(0x2440, 0x10, (u8*)&date, true))
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return std::string();
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date[10] = '\0';
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return date;
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}
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bool CVolumeWiiCrypted::IsWiiDisc() const
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{
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return true;
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}
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u8 CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetDiscNumber() const
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{
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u8 disc_number;
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m_pReader->Read(6, 1, &disc_number);
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return disc_number;
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}
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u64 CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetSize() const
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{
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if (m_pReader)
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return m_pReader->GetDataSize();
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else
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return 0;
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}
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u64 CVolumeWiiCrypted::GetRawSize() const
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{
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if (m_pReader)
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return m_pReader->GetRawSize();
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else
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return 0;
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}
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bool CVolumeWiiCrypted::CheckIntegrity() const
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{
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// Get partition data size
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u32 partSizeDiv4;
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Read(m_VolumeOffset + 0x2BC, 4, (u8*)&partSizeDiv4, false);
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u64 partDataSize = (u64)Common::swap32(partSizeDiv4) * 4;
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u32 nClusters = (u32)(partDataSize / 0x8000);
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for (u32 clusterID = 0; clusterID < nClusters; ++clusterID)
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{
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u64 clusterOff = m_VolumeOffset + m_dataOffset + (u64)clusterID * 0x8000;
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// Read and decrypt the cluster metadata
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u8 clusterMDCrypted[0x400];
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u8 clusterMD[0x400];
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u8 IV[16] = { 0 };
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if (!m_pReader->Read(clusterOff, 0x400, clusterMDCrypted))
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{
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NOTICE_LOG(DISCIO, "Integrity Check: fail at cluster %d: could not read metadata", clusterID);
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return false;
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}
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aes_crypt_cbc(m_AES_ctx.get(), AES_DECRYPT, 0x400, IV, clusterMDCrypted, clusterMD);
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// Some clusters have invalid data and metadata because they aren't
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// meant to be read by the game (for example, holes between files). To
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// try to avoid reporting errors because of these clusters, we check
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// the 0x00 paddings in the metadata.
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//
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// This may cause some false negatives though: some bad clusters may be
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// skipped because they are *too* bad and are not even recognized as
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// valid clusters. To be improved.
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bool meaningless = false;
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for (u32 idx = 0x26C; idx < 0x280; ++idx)
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if (clusterMD[idx] != 0)
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meaningless = true;
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if (meaningless)
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continue;
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u8 clusterData[0x7C00];
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if (!Read((u64)clusterID * 0x7C00, 0x7C00, clusterData, true))
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{
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NOTICE_LOG(DISCIO, "Integrity Check: fail at cluster %d: could not read data", clusterID);
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return false;
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}
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for (u32 hashID = 0; hashID < 31; ++hashID)
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{
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u8 hash[20];
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sha1(clusterData + hashID * 0x400, 0x400, hash);
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// Note that we do not use strncmp here
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if (memcmp(hash, clusterMD + hashID * 20, 20))
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{
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NOTICE_LOG(DISCIO, "Integrity Check: fail at cluster %d: hash %d is invalid", clusterID, hashID);
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return false;
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}
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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} // namespace
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